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Book Review 
rom the point of view of the science of economics, John Ruskin (1819-1900) 
is generally treated, if treated at all, as a marginal aesthete. Ruskin is, 
undoubtedly, something of an outlier, marginalized because his rhetoric and 
interests are more artistic than scientific, and his writing more stylistic than clear 
and coldly logical. Willie Henderson seeks to establish Ruskin’s relevance to the 
discipline of economics by offering a careful and critical reading that engages the 
substance of Ruskin’s economic ideas along with their stylistic presentation.  
Henderson works to persuade the reader that the treatment of Ruskin as a 
nonsensical stylist by economists is misguided, both because economics is better 
when it can account for ethics, history, and beauty, but also because Ruskin’s 
economic ideas are weighty in their own right. While Ruskin does not provide 
straightforwardly clear, scientifically guided texts, his intent is to disrupt and 
disturb the conformity of economic science by offering an “alternative ethical basis 
to existing versions of political economy” (22). Henderson’s reading, informed by 
“the rhetorical turn” in economics, illustrates that Ruskin’s “ethical, aesthetic and 
historicist approach” should be taken seriously as a means to “the realization of 
social harmony” (122). 
First, Henderson explores Ruskin’s economic ideas, especially those found in 
Unto this Last and Fors Clavigera. Ruskin’s economic rhetoric is both “brilliant” 
and carries “a significant economic message to his readership” (45). As everyone 
knows, for Ruskin the production and consumption of a peach and a bombshell 
cannot be reduced to equal terms. What we fail to appreciate is that Ruskin’s 
rhetoric carries with it other significant ideas as well as a powerful methodology 
that would improve the quality of economic thought if it was given its due. 
Ruskin, for example, emphasizes the importance of social relationships. While 
he generally adopts the point of view of an aristocrat who wants the wealthy to do 
right by the poor, his examples are often drawn from the domestic sphere and 
underscore allocation without hostility. By drawing upon Christian concepts, 
Ruskin emphasizes the human soul, the affections, and the moral sentiments. 
Ruskin believes “in the need for a system of ethics neither based on an impossible 
law nor cantilevered on the notion of economic selfishness” (51). He contrasts the 
“destructive principles of laissez-faire and the ‘practical; working of true polity’” 
to initiate a dialogue about the real substance of wealth.  
 
1 † University of Minnesota Duluth, Department of Communication, Anderson Hall, Minnesota, USA. 
 dgore@d.umn.edu 
F 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), D. C. Gore. p.359-361. 
360 
Ruskin, Henderson shows, seeks to uncover the source of wealth in wholesome, 
human work and activity as illustrated “by the Greek notion of techné, as set out in 
Plato’s Republic” (53). Techné signifies “the rules and practical actions governing 
the appropriate (i.e., good or right) application of a craft or skill” (53). Henderson 
develops Ruskin’s use of the concept of techné to uncover the moral motivations 
for human work as opposed to the purely monetary motivations that often prevail 
in economic models. Ruskin’s economic focus is always on justice and true value 
as measured by the social good to the community. Henderson convincingly shows 
that these economic ideas remain relevant and that they constitute “a sustained 
methodological attack on a one-dimensional, hypothetical-deductive notion of 
economic man” (62). 
By examining the structure of his ideas, Henderson uncovers Ruskin’s unique 
methodology of studying economic problems, a methodology originating in 
Baconian observation. Ruskin’s “critical eye and keen sense of observation” was 
honed through his study of art, architecture, and artist’s studios (139). By 
beginning with the centrality of aesthetic judgment and rooted in cultural 
production, Ruskin’s concerns were “about how life ought to be lived” and about 
why “the notion of a separate, segregated economic domain” is essentially wrong-
headed (9). When contrasted with John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Ruskin’s method 
is historical where Mill’s is logical, intuitive where Mill’s is coldly rational and 
scientific (143). Ruskin’s anti-systematic approach to political economy is part of 
the reason why he is an easy figure to marginalize by those who do not see in this 
methodology a means to abstract understanding. This is, however, precisely the 
great gift of Ruskin’s methodology. Henderson reveals that Ruskin’s approach 
encourages us to see more essential truths than those found on the surface of 
things. By concentrating on “a simplified ideal of the independent artisan,” 
Ruskin’s “alternative economic morality” views action “as concrete and moral, 
located in the techné and in the lived experience . . . of what it is to be a farmer, 
housewife, and singer” (84). Henderson notes that this approach stresses the ethical 
purposes of work and seeks to restore moral capacity to the conversation of 
political economy. 
All the while, Henderson makes acute observations and offers insightful 
judgments derived from Ruskin’s rhetoric. Henderson traces the origins of 
Ruskin’s ideas in history and along the way revivifies the importance of a number 
of thinkers to the history of economics. Ruskin admitted that the roots of his ideas 
were found in the classical world, including the works of Xenophon, Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Horace. This tradition gave considerable force to Ruskin’s 
critique of mid-nineteenth century political economy. By tracing this history, 
Henderson provides a lively and provocative reading of the importance of both 
Xenephon and Plato to the history of economic thought. Ruskin extended these 
ideas through his use of domestic metaphors creating “an economic space within 
which social distance, which overcomes the power of social affection and morality, 
is eliminated” (78). Henderson illustrates that Ruskin’s sense of justice is 
essentially platonic, and that Plato inspired Ruskin to see agency in terms of 
justice, morality, and one’s duty to society. Like Plato, Ruskin’s rhetoric leans 
toward the utopian, but it also seeks to create an ethical and practical economics. 
Henderson emphasizes the importance of an economic rhetoric that sees people 
how they are and doing what they do rather than a focus on impersonal and abstract 
economic forces or ideas. 
The biological basis for value, essential to his sense of urgency 
of poverty alleviation, the notion of reason guiding self-interest, 
the sense of market failures, the idea of unequal exchange 
conditions, the painfully slow nature of ‘trickle-down effects’ and 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), D. C. Gore. p.359-361. 
361 
the need for regulation, government and co-operation suggest 
parallels with what today would be called a structuralist approach 
to economic development, and this despite the fact that his 
approach is not essentially materialistic but moral (105). 
Henderson successfully argues that Ruskin’s economic rhetoric is both relevant 
and part of an important strand in the history of ideas which sees human 
productivity and work as a consistent and essential element of human life, human 
culture, and human societies.  
In addition to tracing the origins of Ruskin’s economic thinking, Henderson 
likewise demonstrates the influence of Ruskin’s ideas, including the challenge they 
present to Mill and the illuminating effect they had on William Smart (1853-1915), 
the first occupant of the Adam Smith Chair, John Bates Clark (1847-1938), and 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). By drawing upon Ruskin’s marginalia in his 
personal copy of Mill’s Principles of Political Economy, Henderson works like a 
historical detective, piecing together a plausible account of the development of 
Ruskin’s critique of Mill. The marginalia do not indicate wholesale or unfair 
criticism. Indeed, Henderson shows that the gist of these notes indicate that Ruskin 
learned a great deal from Mill and even admired some passages of his Principles of 
Political Economy. Likewise, he found much to disagree with. Where “Mill 
achieved a logical system,” “Ruskin achieved a set of insights concerning the 
relative nature of economic knowledge which eventually worried its way into the 
thought of his later economically concerned readers” (143). Because “Mill’s notion 
of science expelled literary claims to higher truth” and “excised the imagination,” it 
is well for us to read Ruskin alongside Mill in order to gain a true and just 
appreciation of mid-nineteenth century economic representations (143). 
Henderson shows that Ruskin’s style cannot be divorced from the substance of 
his critique of political economy. Likewise, he proves the relevance and 
importance of Ruskin’s economic ideas. After reading Henderson, it is hard to 
imagine that anyone could dismiss Ruskin as an illegitimate source of economic 
insight and wisdom. Henderson’s argument hinges on the fact that the ancient 
world and in Ruskin there is nothing resembling an economic system “distinct from 
what people do in their lives” (68). By focusing on the “illth” and “wealth” created 
by what we do, Henderson helps us see more clearly the harms of an abstract 
economic science that strives to exist independently of ethics and political 
community. Like Adam Smith and Ruskin before him, Henderson emphasizes that 
few economic indicators are more important than the flourishing culture of 
ordinary people going about their ordinary work. This observational, historical, and 
aesthetic approach to economics helps ensure that we remember the perennial 
relevance of what people actually do, how they actually live, and what they 
actually value. 
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